Does Auditor Tenure Improve Audit Quality? Moderating Effects of Industry Specialization and Fee Dependence by LIM, Chee Yeow et al.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Accountancy School of Accountancy
2010
Does Auditor Tenure Improve Audit Quality?
Moderating Effects of Industry Specialization and
Fee Dependence
Chee Yeow LIM
Singapore Management University, cheeyeowlim@smu.edu.sg
Hun-Tong TAN
Nanyang Technological University
Qiang CHENG
Singapore Management University, qcheng@smu.edu.sg
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1911-3846.2010.01031.x
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research
Part of the Accounting Commons, Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons,
and the Corporate Finance Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Accountancy at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Accountancy by an authorized administrator of Institutional
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
LIM, Chee Yeow; TAN, Hun-Tong; and CHENG, Qiang. Does Auditor Tenure Improve Audit Quality? Moderating Effects of
Industry Specialization and Fee Dependence. (2010). Contemporary Accounting Research. 27, (3), 923-957. Research Collection
School Of Accountancy.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/11
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1638530 
    
 
Singapore Management University 
School of Accountancy Research Paper Series Vol. 2, No. 1 
(Paper No: 2014-07) 
 
 
Does Auditor Tenure Improve Audit Quality? 
Moderating Effects of Industry Specialization and Fee 
Dependence 
  
 
 
Chee-Yeow Lim 
Hun-Tong Tan  
 
  
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1638530 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1638530
Does auditor tenure improve audit quality? Moderating Effects of Industry Specialization 
and Fee Dependence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chee-Yeow Lim 
 
Singapore Management University 
 
 
Hun-Tong Tan 
 
Nanyang Technological University 
 
 
 
September 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We thank the Editor (Michel Magnan), two anonymous referees, and Sanjay Kallapur for 
helpful comments. 
 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1638530 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1638530
Does auditor tenure improve audit quality? Moderating Effects of Industry 
Specialization and Fee Dependence 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We investigate whether the relation between auditor tenure and audit quality is conditional 
on auditor specialization and fee dependence. Although prior studies have investigated the 
relation between extended auditor-client tenure and audit quality, none has examined how 
this relation is jointly influenced by both auditor specialization and fee dependence. Our 
main analyses, using accrual quality as a measure of audit quality, show that firms audited 
by specialists (vs. non-specialists) have relatively higher audit quality with extended auditor 
tenure, and that this relation is negatively moderated by auditors’ fee dependence on clients. 
These results are robust to sensitivity tests, and alternative proxies for audit quality such as 
the issuance of going concern opinions and the market’s response to quarterly earnings 
surprises. 
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1. Introduction 
In this study, we investigate whether the relation between auditor tenure and audit 
quality is conditional on auditor specialization and fee dependence (in terms of economic 
contribution to the public accounting firm’s income). We argue that auditor tenure is 
associated with two related constructs: auditor expertise and economic incentives. First, 
auditor tenure is associated with greater acquired expertise in that with extended auditor 
tenure, the auditor can gain a better understanding of the client’s business processes, and 
risks (Bell et al. 1997). Longer auditor tenure may be associated with reduced vigilance 
through over-familiarity with the client (Mautz and Sharaf 1961), an effect that may be 
remedied by greater auditor expertise (Smith and Kida 1990; Libby and Luft 1993; 
Solomon, Shields, and Whittington 1999). Second, extended auditor tenure (without the 
prospect of mandatory rotation) may create economic incentives for auditors to be less 
independent in that auditors may acquiesce to the client’s demands in order to continue 
to secure a stream of future audit fees (Hoyle 1978; Conference Board 2005). Also, a 
corollary of the earlier expertise argument is that to the extent that the auditor develops, 
through extended tenure, expertise and a reputation for performing audits in the client’s 
industry, the auditor also develops incentives to improve audit quality in order to protect 
this reputational capital and loss of future revenue streams (DeAngelo 1981; Krishnan 
2003). The effects operate in opposite directions. These offsetting effects suggest that in 
assessing the effects of auditor tenure on audit quality, it is important to consider the 
joint consideration of the effects of auditor expertise and incentives, and not either the 
effects of expertise or incentives alone.   
 3
Prior research generally shows that auditor tenure is associated with higher audit 
quality (Geiger and Raghunandan 2002; Johnson, Khurana, and Reynolds 2002; Myers, 
Myers, and Omer 2003; Mansi, Maxswell, and Miller 2004; Ghosh and Moon 2005; 
Chen, Lin, and Lin 2008). However, recent research shows some conflicting results. For 
instance, there is evidence that extended tenure is associated with both positive and 
negative effects on audit quality (Davis, Soo, and Trompeter 2008). Also, Carey and 
Simnett (2006) find no relation between audit partner tenure and accruals. Instead, they 
find that audit quality (as proxied by the incidence of going concern opinions and the 
proclivity to beat earnings benchmarks) is associated with lower audit quality when audit 
partner tenure increases.  
Studies on the moderating effect of incentives effects on auditor tenure have found 
conflicting results on whether audit/non-audit fees (common proxies for auditor 
incentives to please the client) are associated with poorer or superior audit quality with 
auditor tenure (c.f. Gul, Jaggi, and Krishnan 2007, Stanley and Dezoort 2007). Similarly,  
studies that assess the empirical relation between auditor tenure and auditor 
specialization (a common proxy for auditor expertise) have found conflicting results, and 
either document no moderating effect of auditor specialization (Myers et al. 2003), or an 
interaction (Stanley and Dezoort 2007, Gul, Fung, and Jaggi 2009). None of these 
studies examines the effect of both expertise and incentives on the auditor tenure-audit 
quality relation.1
                                                 
1 Gunny, Krishnan, and Zhang (2007) also examine the effect of auditor tenure, auditor specialization and 
fees on audit quality. However, they only examine two-way interactions among these variables, not a 
three-way interaction. For instance, they find some evidence that tenure and specialization are jointly 
associated with higher audit quality, while tenure and abnormal total fees are jointly associated with lower 
audit quality. Note that their sample only includes firms audited by non-Big 4 firms, and hence, their 
results may be not generalizable since a large proportion of the firms in the U.S. are audited by Big 4 
auditors.  
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These opposite and conflicting predictions and findings in prior literature may be 
attributable to failure to jointly examine expertise and incentive constructs, differences in 
empirical proxies, differences in sample or sample periods used, or a combination of 
these reasons. In this study, we develop predictions about the effect of auditor tenure on 
audit quality based on a more complete consideration of the moderating effects of 
auditor expertise and incentives, and test our predictions across a common set of 
empirical proxies used in prior studies and over a common sample period. 
The issue of whether longer auditor tenure impairs auditor independence and audit 
quality has a controversial history (e.g., see Mautz and Sharaf 1961; Metcalf Committee 
Report, U.S. Senate 1976). Recent financial scandals have also precipitated concerns 
over whether auditor tenure impairs auditor independence and audit quality, and have led 
to regulatory interest in the use of mandatory rotation to enhance auditor independence 
and reduce the likelihood of audit failures (POB 2002; SOX 2002; IOSCO 2005).  
Mandatory rotation of auditor has taken two forms: at the audit firm level and at the 
audit partner level. In this study, we examine auditor rotation at the firm level, which has 
continued to attract debate over its efficacy. Mandatory rotation of audit firms has been 
implemented in various parts of the world such as Brazil, Italy, and Singapore, while 
mandatory rotation of audit partners was implemented in Canada and the U.S. In the 
U.S., mandatory audit firm rotation was part of reforms considered by the U.S. General 
Accounting Office (GAO). While the GAO concluded that it would be more prudent to 
take time to assess the effectiveness of the Sarbanes Oxley Act reforms before 
mandating audit firm rotation, it was left as an option for the future (GAO 2003). Even 
where mandatory audit partner rotation has been implemented, pressures for audit firm 
rotation continue (Economist 2004) and audit firm rotation is an issue of continued 
interest by standard setters (IOSCO 2005). More recently, the Commission on Public 
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Trust and Private Enterprise appointed by the Conference Board endorsed the use of 
audit firm rotation, even in the presence of audit partner rotation, to improve auditor 
independence (Conference Board 2005).  Audit firm rotation is also a recurrent and 
current concern of public accounting firms (Pricewaterhouse Coopers 2007).2  
Arguments on the costs and benefits of extended auditor tenure invariably involve 
issues related to auditor expertise and incentives. Arguments in favor of extended 
auditor-client relation rest primarily on an expertise argument (although, as we explain 
below, an incentive argument can also apply). Specifically, auditors climb a steep 
learning curve to understand the client’s industry and the business it operates, along with 
the associated risks (Knapp 1991; Pricewaterhouse Coopers 2002). This suggests that 
auditors are less likely to detect errors when they first engage in the audit of the client. 
There is empirical evidence that alleged audit failures (AICPA 1992; Geiger and 
Raghunandan 2002; Carcello and Nagy 2004a) and the likelihood of litigation (Palmrose 
1991) are higher during the early years of an auditor-client relation. With longer tenure, 
auditors develop a better understanding, both of the client and the industry. One 
implication is that, with extended tenure, to the extent that the auditor develops a 
reputation for performing audits in the client’s industry and grows his client base in that 
industry, the auditor also develops incentives to improve audit quality in order to protect 
this reputation and loss of clients from inappropriately acquiescing to any single client’s 
demands (DeAngelo 1981; Krishnan 2003). 
Arguments against extended auditor-client relationships and in favor of mandatory 
rotation are based on both cognitive (expertise-related) and incentive arguments. For 
example, one reason cited by the Cohen Commission (AICPA 1978) for mandatory 
                                                 
2 It is also not practically feasible to investigate audit partner rotation effects using Canadian and U.S. data 
because the name of the engagement audit partner is not disclosed in the audit report. Audit firm rotation 
can be seen as a more extreme form of auditor rotation in that when audit firms rotate, the engagement 
audit partner necessarily changes too. 
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rotation is that the new auditor brings a fresh perspective to the audit. Allegedly, an 
auditor who has audited the client over time can become over-familiar with the client, 
become complacent, and develop “blind spots.” These are cognitive limitations 
independent of an incentive argument, and may be mitigated by auditors with expertise 
(Smith and Kida 1990).  
The second reason is an incentive argument. For instance, it has been alleged that 
“long association between a corporation and an accounting firm may lead to such close 
identification of the accounting firm with the interests of its client’s management …” 
(U.S. Senate 1976, p. 21). Similarly, the report of the Commission on Auditors’ 
Responsibilities (AICPA 1978, p. 108) highlights that, with mandatory rotation, “the 
auditor’s incentive for resisting pressure from management would be increased.” 
Specifically, over time, the auditor may become less independent, less skeptical, and 
more complacent, motivated by concerns about maintaining the client relation so as to 
profit from it. This argument suggests that an auditor’s incentives to be less independent 
increase with extended tenure, particularly for important clients that the auditor earns 
significant audit fees from.  
In summary, increased auditor tenure is associated with both increased expertise 
factors and associated incentives to protect reputational capital (which increases audit 
quality), as well as increased incentives to please the client (which reduces audit quality). 
In our study, we proxy auditor expertise by whether auditors are industry specialists. We 
use this proxy because a client’s business operations and risks vary by industry, and prior 
research documents industry-specific variation in the nature and incidence of financial 
statement errors (Maletta and Wright 1996). Hence, industry specialist auditors’ greater 
expertise in the specific industry domain enables them to better acquire knowledge 
concerning the client’s business and risks (Bell, Peecher, and Solomon 2005). 
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Specialization also proxies for incentives for auditors to protect their reputational capital 
and avoid costly litigation (Krishnan 2003). Hence, specialization can be considered to 
be proxying jointly both for expertise and the incentive to protect this expertise. We 
consider the dependence of an auditor on fees received from a particular client to be 
associated with greater auditors’ incentives to side the client and be less objective in 
their judgments. We assess how auditor specialization and fee dependence interact with 
auditor tenure in determining audit quality. 
Empirical measures for audit quality can be noisy and there is little consensus on 
what is the most appropriate proxy. Hence, we conduct our empirical tests using multiple 
proxies of audit quality that have been used in prior studies. We use, as our main proxy 
for audit quality, the accrual quality measure developed by Dechow and Dichev (2002), 
with modifications suggested by McNichols (2002). We proxy auditor industry 
specialization based on the industry market share of the Big N auditors. We use the 
measure of client importance by Chung and Kallapur (2003) at the city level to proxy 
auditors’ economic bond with the client.3  
Our results indicate that audit quality is higher for firms audited by specialists 
relative to non-specialists when auditor tenure increases. Further, we find that such a 
relation is moderated by fee dependence. These results are generally robust to various 
sensitivity analyses, and other proxies for audit quality such as higher propensity for 
auditors to issue going-concern opinion to financially distressed firms and stronger 
market’s response to quarterly earnings surprises (i.e., earnings-returns coefficients). 
Our paper contributes to the literature on the audit quality effects of audit tenure. 
From a theoretical perspective, our paper contributes to the audit tenure literature by 
                                                 
3 The individual practice office in a particular city is generally the locus of contracting between the client 
and the audit firm. Therefore, the variable of interest is the importance of the client to the practice office at 
the city level rather than across the entire audit firm. 
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posting and demonstrating that the tenure-audit quality effect is conditional on both 
auditor specialization and fee dependence. Prior studies have examined only a subset of 
these independent variables, and theoretical arguments made in these studies on 
conditions under which auditor tenure improves or impairs audit quality are less 
complete. Our results also provide useful evidence to regulators and policy makers on 
the impact of audit tenure on audit quality. Regulators in various countries have 
mandated auditor rotation, presumably on the premise that extended auditor tenure is 
detrimental to audit quality. We show that extended auditor tenure does not necessarily 
decrease audit quality; in fact, audit quality is improved with extended tenure when two 
conditions are met—the auditor is a specialist and has low fee dependence. These results 
should be helpful to the GAO in its assessment of whether to mandate audit firm rotation 
(GAO 2003), and also to other standard setters that are deliberating on this issue (IOSCO 
2005). The findings should also be of interest to public accounting firms in their efforts 
to improve audit quality. Our results suggest that in developing longer-term ties with a 
client, public accounting firms should consider investing in resources to further develop 
expertise in the client’s industry and to avoid overly high fee dependence on any client. 
In turn, this has broader implications on public accounting firms’ strategies/policies to 
position themselves as industry specialists and on their client acceptance/retention 
decisions. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We discuss prior literature and 
develop our hypotheses in section 2. Section 3 describes our sample and variable 
measurement.  We present the empirical results in Sections 4, while Section 5 discusses 
the sensitivity analyses performed. We offer some concluding remarks in Section 6. 
2. Background and hypothesis development  
Effects of auditor tenure 
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Arising from regulatory interest in the issue of mandatory auditor rotation, several 
recent studies investigate the relation between auditor tenure and various measures of 
audit quality. The dominant finding is that audit quality improves with auditor tenure 
(Geiger and Raghunandan 2002; Johnson et al. 2002; Myers et al. 2003; Mansi et al. 
2004; Ghosh and Moon 2005). There are some exceptions, with recent evidence showing 
that audit quality deteriorates either with increased auditor tenure (Carey and Simnett 
2006), or both at the earlier or later part of auditor tenure (Davis et al. 2008). A recent 
study by Manry, Mock, and Turner (2008) find that audit quality is improved only for 
small clients with partner tenure of greater than seven years.  
Some recent studies examine the interaction between auditor tenure and either fees 
or auditor specialization. However, seemingly opposite conclusions are reached. One set 
of studies examines the interaction between auditor tenure and audit fees. Gul et al. 
(2007) find that non-audit fees (but not audit fees) are associated with poorer audit 
quality in terms of higher discretionary current accruals for firms with short auditor 
tenure. In contrast, Stanley and DeZoort (2007) document that audit fees (but not non-
audit fees) are associated with improved audit quality in terms of lower likelihood of 
restatement for firms with short auditor tenure. Another set of studies examines the 
interaction between auditor tenure and auditor specialization, but results differ depending 
on the proxy for audit quality.  Myers et al. (2003) find no such interaction with 
discretionary accruals. In contrast, using discretionary accruals and restatements as 
proxies for audit quality, other studies document this interaction (Stanley and Dezoort 
2007; Gul et al. 2009).  
Effects of industry specialization 
Audit firms that are industry specialists invest time and financial resources in 
developing personnel and technology in specific industries to improve audit quality.  
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Thus, auditors working in audit firms that are industry specialists have more 
opportunities to develop expertise than those working in non-specialist firms. Because 
clients’ operations and business risks vary by industry and research indicates that the 
nature and incidence of financial statement errors vary by industry (Maletta and Wright 
1996), industry-specialist auditors’ greater expertise in the specific industry allows them 
to better acquire knowledge concerning the client’s business, operations, and risks (Bell 
et al. 2005) compared to non-specialists. Consequently, they are also less likely to be 
misled by management representations (Solomon et al. 1999).  
Auditors who are industry specialists also likely have incentives to protect their 
reputational capital and avoid reputation damage. Inasmuch as auditors have been 
posited to be more independent when they have a larger client base to lose (DeAngelo 
1981),4 industry specialists have more to lose from poor audit quality in terms of losing 
future revenue streams and fee premium. Thus, they have greater incentives than non-
specialists to maintain high quality audits (be more independent) to avoid jeopardizing 
this reputation (Watts and Zimmerman 1983) through litigation exposure (Shu 2000). 
Prior research shows that specialist auditors’ clients are less likely to be associated with 
SEC enforcement actions (Carcello and Nagy 2004b) and are more likely to comply with 
auditing standards (O’ Keefe, Kin, and Gaver 1994). 
Effects of fee dependence 
Economic theory indicates that when an auditor derives a high proportion of revenue 
from a particular client, this creates economic bonds on the auditor and causes the 
auditor to be financially reliant on the client, which can cause the auditor to lose 
objectivity (DeAngelo 1981). Psychology research suggests the same outcome but the 
                                                 
4 Auditor specialization is typically measured in terms of market share (e.g., Chung and Kallpaur 2003; 
Lim and Tan 2008), which further reinforces the point that specialists have more incentives to be 
independent as they have more market share to lose from poor audit quality. 
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mechanism by which the auditor loses objectivity with fee dependence is said to be 
unconscious (Kunda 1990; Bazerman, Morgan, and Lowenstein 1997).  
We posit that greater clarity on the auditor tenure-performance relationship requires 
the joint consideration of the auditor’s industry specialization and fee dependence. Two 
interaction patterns are possible, and we discuss each of these in the next two sub-
sections.  
Auditor tenure and industry specialization relation, and the moderating effect of fee 
dependence 
 
The first interaction pattern focuses on the relation between auditor tenure and 
industry specialization, and how their effect on audit quality is contingent on fee 
dependence.   
In terms of the relation between auditor tenure and industry specialization, one of the 
arguments for extended auditor tenure (and against mandatory rotation) is that auditors 
take time to acquire specific knowledge about the industry and business of their clients. 
Auditors who are industry specialists begin the audit of a new client with superior 
knowledge of the industry, which facilitates their understanding of the client relative to 
non-specialists. One possibility is that, particularly in a relatively static industry and 
client environment, non-specialists can catch up with the specialists in their knowledge 
of the client with increased tenure, which suggests no effect of industry specialization 
with an extended auditor-client relationship.  
However, the environment is more likely to be dynamic (Bell et al. 2005). In a 
dynamic and changing environment, specialists are more likely to be able to adapt, 
update their knowledge, and keep abreast of changes. Indeed, psychology research 
indicates that people who start off with higher domain knowledge are better able to 
acquire more high-quality knowledge over time and at a faster rate than those with lower 
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domain knowledge (e.g., see Chiesi, Spilich, and Voss 1979; Bonner 2007).5 This notion 
of adaptation over time is implicit in a common argument made against extended 
tenure—that is, as auditor tenure increases, auditors develop more blind spots in terms of 
detecting problems in the client’s business process and controls, and errors in the 
financial statements. Presumably, this can arise because the auditor becomes over-
familiar with the client and complacent (e.g., in assuming that things that had worked in 
the past will continue to do so), or because the auditor has not sufficiently kept abreast 
with changes in the client and in the industry. However, the greater resources invested by 
audit firms specializing in particular industries in their personnel and technology likely 
enable their staff to be more adaptive in their audit approaches in response to business or 
industry changes. To the extent that the environment is dynamic over time, these 
arguments suggest that audit quality is more likely to increase with tenure (i.e., over time) 
for specialist auditors than non-specialist auditors. In addition, as we mentioned earlier, 
specialist auditors have greater incentives than non-specialists to maintain high quality 
audits to protect their reputational capital. 
However, a competing incentive to reduce audit quality arising from fee dependence 
is likely to reduce the beneficial effect of auditor specialization on extended auditor 
tenure. We predict that the specialization by tenure interaction described above is 
contingent on fee dependence. With extended auditor tenure, audit quality 
correspondingly increases with industry specialization but is more likely so when fee 
dependence is low. The reason is that although specialist auditors are likely associated 
with higher audit quality with longer auditor tenure, incentives to align with the interest 
                                                 
5 Like the other theories we use (e.g., auditor expertise, bias from fee dependence), this theory of learning 
is at the individual level as it is the audit partner who interacts with the client and forms audit judgments. 
These effects likely generalize at the firm level to the extent that the public accounting firm is essentially a 
collection of individual auditors. Note that the non-availability of empirical proxies for tenure, fee 
dependence and specialization at the individual partner necessitates that we use firm-level proxies for these 
constructs. 
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of an important client (in terms of fees earned) may somewhat cloud their professional 
judgment and increase their proclivity to take the side of the client on controversial 
accounting issues. This premise is consistent with the argument by Bazerman et al. (1997, 
p. 93-94) that with fee dependence, “independence becomes a problem even for the most 
moral, honest auditor. Despite the auditors’ best effort to place the external users’ 
interests above the client’s and to maintain objectivity, they may be unable to completely 
overcome cognitive or psychological biases that make them arrive at marginal decisions 
in the client’s favor.” This suggests the following directional hypothesis: 
H1a: As auditor tenure increases, audit quality increases with auditors’ industry 
specialization but is more likely so when fee dependence is low.  
Auditor tenure and fee dependence relation, and the moderating effect of industry 
specialization 
 
The second possible interaction pattern focuses on the relation between auditor 
tenure and fee dependence, and how their effect on audit quality is contingent on the 
auditor’s industry specialization.  
In terms of the relation between auditor tenure and fee dependence, one argument 
against extended auditor tenure (and for auditor rotation) is that over time, the auditor 
becomes less independent and audit quality goes down arising from economic bonds by 
way of fee dependence formed between auditor and client. The reasoning is that with 
mandatory rotation (i.e., without extended tenure), “in disagreeing with management, 
auditors would no longer be risking a stream of revenues that they believed would 
continue in ‘perpetuity,’ since the audit engagement would no longer be perceived as 
permanent” (Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise 2005, p. 39). This 
argument suggests lower audit quality with longer auditor tenure, with the effect 
magnified in the presence of high fee dependence since an auditor would be loath to lose 
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a client that contributes significantly to the income earned by the public accounting 
firm.6 Interestingly, economic bonding from high fee dependence also argues against 
short auditor tenure. Following DeAngelo (1981), to the extent that auditors low-ball 
audit fees, auditors are more likely to acquiesce to clients’ demands in the initial years 
for fear of threats of dismissal and loss of future quasi-rents” (Geiger and Raghunandan 
2002)—this effect should be greater for higher fee dependence as the magnitude of these 
quasi-rents is clearly higher for clients whose fees form a significant proportion of the 
public accounting firm’s revenue. Thus, the joint consideration of fee dependence and 
auditor tenure does not indicate a clear directional effect on audit quality: with  greater 
economic incentives to side the client with higher fee dependence, audit quality may 
suffer either with extended tenure or short tenure. However, any dysfunctional effect is 
less likely for industry specialists than non-specialists. The reason is that specialist 
auditors are more likely to resist such incentives arising from their relatively stronger 
incentives to preserve their reputational asset. Because the directional nature of the fee 
dependence by tenure relation is unclear, we make a general prediction below: 
H1b: The joint effect of auditor tenure and fee dependence on audit quality is moderated 
by auditors’ industry specialization. 
3. Data and variables’ measurement 
Data  
Our initial sample consists of 40,881 firm-years with fee information from the Audit 
Analytics database, and financial information in Compustat for fiscal years 2000-2005.7 
                                                 
6 Studies on the relation between the provision of non-audit services (which contributes to total fee income 
of the public accounting firm) and audit quality has yielded mixed results, with some finding negative 
effects (e.g., Frankel et al. 2002; Khurana and Raman 2006) and others finding no effect (e.g., Ashbaugh, 
et al. 2003; Chung and Kallapur 2003; Li 2009). 
7 Compustat covers full information for the firms up to the year 2006. Our sample ends at 2005 since we 
require one-year-ahead cash flow from operating activities to compute our proxy for audit quality, accrual 
quality. Our sample begins in year 2000 since it is the first year where fee data is available. 
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We restrict our study to clients of Big N auditors to control for brand name (Johnson et 
al. 2002; Chung and Kallapur 2003). Accordingly, we remove 11,436 firm-years that are 
not audited by Big N auditors. Given the fundamentally different operating 
characteristics associated with financial institutions, we exclude 3,764 financial 
companies from the analyses (SIC Codes 6000–6999). We drop 4,356 firm-year 
observations due to missing data needed to compute fee dependence at the city-level. We 
remove 3,352 firm-years without sufficient data to compute accrual quality. Finally, we 
delete the top and bottom one percent of each of the continuous control variables used in 
the regression to remove extreme values, and the final sample usable for the study is 
12,783 firm-years, with complete information on the control variables.  Panels A and B 
in Table 1 report the distribution of sample firms by year and industry, respectively, for 
the data used for the accrual quality test. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Auditor tenure 
Following prior studies (Myers et al. 2003; Ghosh and Moon 2005), we measure 
tenure as the cumulative number of years the auditor has been employed by the firm. We 
do not employ a continuous measure for auditor tenure since the relation between auditor 
tenure and audit quality may not be linear. Instead, we use dummy variables to capture 
the effect of tenure on audit quality in two ways. First, we use the median tenure as a cut 
off to indicate long versus short tenure (DTENU). Second, following prior studies (e.g., 
Johnson et al. 2002; Carcello and Nagy 2004a), we use two indicator variables, one for 
short tenure (SHORT, equals one when the length of the auditor-client relationship is 
three years or less, and zero otherwise), and another for long tenure (LONG, equals one 
when the length of the auditor-client relationship is nine years or longer, and zero 
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otherwise). The comparison group relates to firms with medium auditor tenure (four to 
eight years).   
Auditor industry specialization 
Previous studies (e.g., Chung and Kallpaur 2003; Lim and Tan 2008) typically use 
the market share of the Big N public accounting firms to proxy for auditor specialization. 
We define auditors with a large industry market share (defined as two-digit SIC code) as 
the specialist (SPEC). We consider an auditor to have a large market share in the 
industry if the auditor has at least 24% for the 2000-2001 period, and 30% for the 2002-
2005 period.8 We also test the sensitivity of our results using other operationalizations of 
auditor industry specialization. 
Fee dependence 
We use client importance, which captures the relative significance of a client’s total 
fees to the fee revenue received by the auditor in the same city,9 as a measure to capture 
economic bonding between the auditor and the clients (Chung and Kallapur 2003).10  
This measure better captures the specific economic bonding unique to each auditor, 
relative to the auditor’s total fee revenue. A total fees measure does not take into 
consideration the size of the auditor, in that the same total fees may be economically 
significant for one auditor but not for another, depending on its total fee revenue.  
                                                 
8 Following Neal and Riley (2004), we employ a cut off for ‘large’ market shares of (1/N)*1.2, where N is 
the number of big audit firms. The largest firms are the Big 5 after the merger between Coopers and 
Lybrand and Price Waterhouse in 1998, and Big 4 after the demise of Arthur Andersen in 2002. This 
measure includes all firms that cross the 24%/30% thresholds. 
9 Consistent with Francis, Reichelt, and Wang (2005), we define cities using the U.S. Census Bureau 
definition of metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) to identify metropolitan areas based on state and county 
codes. 
10 We do not solely use non-audit fees for two reasons. First, high audit fees (and not non-audit fees per se) 
can also create similar incentives for auditors to compromise audit quality in their reporting decisions with 
respect to a specific client. Second, the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) passed in 2002 effectively bans 
auditors from performing many types of non-audit services, leading to a corresponding decline in non-
audit services revenue. However, total fees is likely to be stable as the decline in revenues from non-audit 
services are likely to be offset by substantial increases in audit fees due to, for example, the cost of 
complying Section 404 implementation costs under SOX.  
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Empirical model 
The conventional linear discretionary accruals models introduced by Jones (1991) 
have been widely used in accounting literature to estimate discretionary accruals (e.g., 
Myers et al. 2003; Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Johnson et al. 2002). There is little evidence 
documenting which discretionary accruals model is superior or more appropriate. In a 
recent study, Jones, Krishnan, and Melendrez (2008) evaluate a comprehensive set of 
proxies for earnings management used in the prior studies, and report that McNichols’ 
(2002) modification of Dechow and Dichev (2002) model is better able to detect 
earnings management. Hence, our main tests are based on the modified accrual quality 
measure by McNichols (2002). The same model has also been used in recent studies (e.g., 
Srinidhi and Gul 2007; Francis et al. 2005). We use an alternative discretionary accruals 
model in our sensitivity tests.  
Following McNichols (2002), we measure accrual quality by using the following 
regression model: 
CAi,t = α0 + α1 OCFi,t-1 + α2 OCFi,t + α3 OCFi,t+1 + α4 ΔREVi,t + α5 PPEi,t + vi,t        (1) 
where 
CA = current accruals measured by net income before extraordinary 
items plus deprecation and amortization minis operating cash 
flow; 
OCF = operating cash flow at year t-1, t , and t+1; 
ΔREV = change in revenues; 
PPE = gross value of property, plant, and equipment. 
 
All variables are scaled by average total assets. The regression is run for each industry-
year with a minimum of 20 observations in each 2-digit SIC industry. The coefficients α1 
to α3 measure the associations of current accruals with the cash flows in the previous, 
current, and subsequent years, respectively. We expect α1 and α3 to be positive, and α2 to 
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be negative.11 The residual from the regression is denoted as DD.  The absolute value of 
the DD is our measure of accrual quality (denoted as |DD|).12  Higher values of |DD| 
indicate lower accrual quality. 
We run the following regression to test the association between auditor tenure, 
auditor specialization, and fee dependence on accrual quality:  
|DD| = φ0 + φ1 TENU + φ2 MV + φ3 INGR+ φ4 OCF + φ5 LITIG + φ6 ZSCORE  
+ φ7 MB + φ8 AGE + φ9 SPEC + φ10 FEE + φ11 TENU*SPEC  
+ φ12 TENU*FEE  + φ13 SPEC*FEE + φ14 TENU*SPEC*FEE  
+Year Dummies + ε                         (2)   
|DD| = accrual quality measure which is the absolute value of the 
residual estimated from equation (1); 
TENU = auditor tenure measured as follows; 
DTENU = indicator variable equals one if the tenure is greater than the 
sample median, and zero otherwise; 
SHORT = indicator variable, equals one when the length of the auditor-
client relationship is three years or less, and zero otherwise; 
LONG = indicator variable, equals one when the length of the auditor-
client relationship is nine years or longer, and zero otherwise; 
MV = natural log of market capitalization at fiscal year end; 
INGR = industry sales growth over the year (by two-digit SIC code);  
OCF = operating cash flows divided by total assets at fiscal year end; 
LITIG = 1 if the firm operates in a high-litigation industry and 0 
otherwise. High-litigation industries are industries with SIC 
codes 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, and 7370-
7374 (as used by Frankel et al. 2002 and Ashbaugh et al. 2003); 
ZSCORE = Zmijewski’s (1984) bankruptcy scores; 
MB = market to book value of equity; 
AGE = natural logarithm of the number of years since the company was 
listed on a stock exchange; 
SPEC = 1 if the auditor is the specialist in the industry, and 0 otherwise; 
                                                 
11 Accruals represent inter-temporal shifting of cash flows. Other things being constant, if more of current 
cash flows are shifted to either the previous or the next period, the current accruals will be higher, and the 
current cash flows will be lower. Hence α2 is expected to be negative. Dechow and Dichev (2002) argue 
that the current accruals anticipate future cash flows; hence α3 is expected to be positive. Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) also argue that some accruals defer the recognition of some past cash flows into current 
earnings and that once current cash flow is controlled for, the association between current accruals and 
past cash flows should be positive. Hence α1 is expected to be positive. 
12 Dechow and Dichev (2002) uses the standard deviation of the residuals for each firm as the accrual 
quality measure. They suggest that an alternative measure for the accrual quality at the firm-year level is 
the absolute value of the residual for that year (note 6). Both Srinidhi and Gul (2007) and Jones et al. 
(2008) use the absolute values as their proxy for earnings management.  
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FEE = fee dependence measured by the ratio of a particular client’s 
total fees given all total fees received by the audit firm in the 
same city. 
 
We include various control variables that may potentially affect accruals. Small 
firms, those in industries with high sales growth, and firms with low cash flow from 
operations tend to record higher accruals (Myers et al. 2003), while firms with high 
litigation risk are more likely to manage earnings (Frankel et al. 2002). We control for 
firms’ financial conditions (as proxied by Zmijewski’s bankruptcy scores) and growth 
opportunities since financially distressed firms and high growth firms are more likely to 
manage earnings (Defond and Jiambalvo 1994).  
The interaction term, TENU*SPEC, is used when we test H1a. The coefficient for 
TENU*SPEC shows the incremental effect of TENU on |DD| when a firm is audited by 
specialist auditors than when it is audited by non-specialist auditors. To the extent that 
the improvement in audit quality with extended auditor tenure is higher for specialists 
compared to non-specialists, we expect the coefficient for TENU*SPEC to be negative. 
However, H1a predicts that the negative association between TENU*SPEC and |DD| to 
be moderated (reduced) by fee dependence; hence, we expect the coefficient for 
TENU*SPEC*FEE to be positive. The interaction term, TENU*FEE, is used to test H1b. 
The coefficient for TENU*FEE shows the incremental effect of TENU on |DD| when a 
firm’s fee revenue is more important to an auditor. The extent that TENU*FEE is 
moderated by auditor specialization is captured by TENU*SPEC*FEE.  
Because the accrual quality for a particular firm may not be fully independent over 
consecutive years, residuals obtained in regression analyses may be serially correlated. 
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Hence, we use OLS regressions with clustered robust errors (Rogers 1993; Petersen 
2009).13  
4. Results 
In Table 2, we report the mean coefficients of the industry-year cross-sectional 
regressions from estimating equation (1). Adj. R2 is the average of the adjusted R2 from 
the 286 industry-year regressions. The t-statistics are based on the mean of the 
coefficients from the industry-year regressions.  
As expected, a1 and a3, the coefficients of previous and subsequent period cash 
flows, are positive and significant at the 1% level. a2, the coefficient of the current cash 
flow, is negative and significant at the 1% level. Consistent with our expectation, we find 
that increases in sales are associated significantly with higher current accruals. However, 
we do no find a significant association between PPE and current accruals. The average 
adjusted R2 is 39.3%, similar to that reported in Dechow and Dichev (2002).  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
In Table 3, we report the descriptive statistics in Panel A and the correlation 
coefficients for the variables used in equation (2) in Panel B. The mean (median) auditor 
tenure in years is 10.51 (8). On average, 21% of the firms have auditor-client relation of 
three years or less, while 46% of the firms have auditor-client relation of nine years or 
more. The mean (median) value of |DD| is 0.0111 (0.0005) while the mean (median) 
value of |DD| is 0.0565 (0.0412). 
Panel B shows the correlations between the variables used in the regression model. 
The correlations between |DD| and DTENU, and between |DD| and LONG, are both -0.05 
(significant at 1% level), consistent with the notion that long auditor tenure is associated 
                                                 
13 We detected the presence of heteroskedasticity using the White’s (1980) specification. Hence, the t-
values reported are based on robust standard errors. 
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with higher audit quality. The correlation between |DD| and SHORT is 0.04 (also 
significant at 1% level), suggesting that short auditor tenure is detrimental to audit 
quality. Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Krishnan 2003), |DD| is negatively and 
significantly associated with SPEC (correlation=-0.09). We do not find evidence that fee 
dependence alone erodes audit quality. The association between |DD| and FEE is -0.03 
and significant.14  
 [Insert Table 3 here] 
We report the regression results for the accrual quality test in Table 4. Panel A shows 
the results when auditor tenure is proxied by DTENU. Model 1 reports the results of 
auditor tenure, auditor specialization, and fee dependence on |DD|. DTENU is negatively 
associated with |DD| at 10% level. Both SPEC and FEE are significantly and negatively 
associated with |DD| at 5% level. For the set of control variables, our results indicate that 
large firms, firms with higher cash flow, and firms in high-growth industry have higher 
audit quality (lower |DD|). 15   In contrast, high growth firms, firms with higher 
bankruptcy risk, and firms in highly litigious industries are associated with lower audit 
quality (higher |DD|).  
We include an additional interaction term DTENU*SPEC in model 2. The coefficient 
for DTENU*SPEC is negative and statistically significant at 5% level, suggesting that 
the audit quality is higher for specialists relative to non-specialists when auditor tenure is 
long.  
                                                 
14 Frankel et al. (2002) report a similar negative correlation between ABSDACC and rank of total fees (-
0.03, significant at 10%), while Khurana and Raman (2006) also report a significant negative relation (-
0.06) between TFEE/OFFICEREV and their proxy of audit quality, cost of equity. 
15 The negative association between |DD| and INGR is unexpected. Myers et al. (2003) also report mixed 
results for the association between discretionary accruals and INGR. They find that INGR is negatively 
associated with discretionary accruals in the absolute accruals test, although the association is not 
significant. For the signed accruals tests, they find that INGR is negatively (positively) and significantly 
associated with positive (negative) discretionary accruals at 1% level.   
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In model 3, we include the interaction term DTENU*FEE. The coefficient for 
DTENU*FEE, which shows the incremental effect of DTENU on |DD| when fee 
dependence increases, is statistically insignificant.  
The full model with various interaction terms is provided in model 4. The coefficient 
for DTENU*SPEC is negative and significant at 5% level, and the coefficient for 
DTENU*SPEC*FEE is positive and significant at 1% level. This finding is consistent 
with H1a, where we predict that the negative association between DTENU*SPEC and 
|DD| is moderated by fee dependence. In contrast, the results are inconsistent with H1b 
since the coefficient for DTENU*FEE is insignificant in both models 3 and 4. 
Panel B reports the results when auditor tenure is proxied by two indicator variables, 
SHORT and LONG. In model 1, SHORT is positively and significantly associated with 
|DD|, while LONG is not associated with |DD|, consistent with the evidence reported in 
Johnson et al. (2002). In model 2, the coefficient for the interaction terms LONG*SPEC 
is negative and significant, suggesting that audit quality is higher for specialists relative 
to non-specialists when auditor tenure is long. In contrast, the coefficient for the 
interaction SHORT*SPEC is insignificant, indicating that audit quality is not higher for 
specialists relative to non-specialists when auditor tenure is short. In model 3, the 
coefficients for SHORT*FEE and LONG*FEE are negative but statistically insignificant. 
In the last model where we include all the interaction terms, the coefficient for 
LONG*SPEC is negative and statistically significant at 5% level. Further, the coefficient 
for LONG*SPEC*FEE is positive and significant at 5% level. On the other hand, the 
coefficients for SHORT*SPEC and SHORT*SPEC*FEE are both statistically 
insignificant. The evidence suggests that the negative association between tenure and 
specialization interaction is moderated by fee dependence only for long tenured auditors 
but not for short-tenured auditors. Again, this finding is consistent with our prediction in 
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H1a. As before, we do not find evidence to support H1b, since the coefficients for 
SHORT*FEE and LONG*FEE are insignificant in both models 3 and 4. 
Overall, our results suggest that audit quality is higher with increased auditor tenure 
for specialists but not non-specialists. Further, consistent with our prediction in H1a, the 
interaction between auditor tenure and specialization is moderated by fee dependence.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
5. Sensitivity analyses 
Alternative measure of specialization  
Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Krishnan 2003), we use the national industry 
market share of the Big N public accounting firms to proxy for auditor specialization. 
More recent studies (e.g., Francis et al. 2005) however, suggest that the appropriate unit 
to measure auditor expertise is at the city level. We test the robustness of our results by 
using this alternative definition of specialization at the city level. We define auditors 
having the largest market share in an industry in a particular city to be industry leaders at 
the city level (CSPEC). We also specify another indicator variable, BSPEC, which 
equals one if the auditor is a specialist both at the national and city level. We report the 
results for the full regression model in Table 5.  
Consistent with our main analysis, the coefficients for DTENU*CSPEC and 
DTENU*BSPEC are negative and significant and the coefficients for 
DTENU*CSPEC*FEE and DTENU*BSPEC*FEE are positive and significant. We also 
find consistent results when tenure is measured by LONG and SHORT. The negative 
association between tenure and specialization interaction is moderated by fee 
dependence only for long tenured auditors but not for short tenured auditors. This 
finding is consistent with our prediction in H1a. As before, we do not find evidence to 
support H1b. 
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[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Signed accrual quality tests 
In our main analyses, we use the absolute value of accrual quality as a measure of 
audit quality, which captures the combined effect of income-increasing and income- 
decreasing accruals. However, income-increasing accruals may pose a greater concern to 
auditors, as they are likely to be associated with opportunistic earnings management. On 
the other hand, while downward adjustment of reported earnings could be opportunistic, 
it is more ambivalent as a measure of earnings management as it may also be considered 
as a form of conservative accounting (Ashbaugh et al. 2003). We conduct separate tests 
based on the signs of the accrual quality.  
As the results for the full regression model reported in Table 6 show, for the positive 
accrual sample, we find consistent results with our main analysis. However, the evidence 
for negative accrual is mixed. The coefficient for DTENU*SPEC*FEE is positive and 
significant while the coefficient for LONG*SPEC*FEE is insignificant. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Alternative model specification for accruals 
We use the modified accrual quality measure by McNichols (2002) to proxy for audit 
quality. As a robustness check, we also use the cross-sectional modified Jones’s (1991) 
model to estimate discretionary accruals. Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) show that 
discretionary accrual estimates are correlated with firm performance. To adjust for 
performance, we compute discretionary current accruals based on a portfolio approach, 
as in Ashbaugh et al. (2003). Specifically, we partition firms within each two-digit SIC 
code into deciles based on their prior year’s ROA. Performance-adjusted discretionary 
current accruals are calculated as the difference between a sample firm’s discretionary 
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current accruals and the median discretionary current accruals for each ROA decile 
excluding the sample firm. The absolute values of the discretionary current accruals 
serve as our alternative proxy for audit quality.16 We obtain similar results (untabulated) 
as our main analysis using this alternative proxy for audit quality. The coefficient 
estimate for DTENU*SPEC is negative and marginally significant (t=-1.62, p=0.10), and 
DTENU*SPEC*FEE is positive and significant (t=2.28. p=0.02). The coefficient 
estimate for LONG*SPEC is negative and marginally significant (t=-1.91, p=0.06) and 
LONG*SPEC*FEE is positive and marginally significant (t=1.78, p=0.08). Again, we do 
not find a significant tenure by fee interaction.17 The coefficients for SHORT*SPEC (t=-
0.66, p=0.51) and SHORT*SPEC*FEE (t=-0.07, p=0.95) are not statistically significant. 
As before, we do not find a significant tenure by fee interaction. The coefficients for 
DTENU*FEE (t=-0.89, p=0.38), SHORT*FEE (t=-0.40, p=0.69) and LONG*FEE (t=-
1.8, p=0.17) are all insignificant.  
Effect of SOX on audit quality 
To assess whether our results are influenced by the passing of the Sarbanes Oxley 
Act (SOX) of 2002, we repeat our analyses for both pre- and post-SOX periods (i.e., the 
2000-2001 period versus the 2002-2005 period). 
Similar to our main analysis, the three-way interactions (DTENU*SPEC*FEE) are 
significant for both pre- and post-period (t=1.86, p=0.06 and t=2.38, p=0.02 
respectively). However, the coefficient for LONG*SPEC*FEE is positive and marginally 
significant only in the pre-period (t=1.77, p=0.09), but not in the post-period (t=1.25, 
p=0.21). The coefficients for SHORT*SPEC*FEE are both insignificant in the pre- and 
                                                 
16 The mean (median) discretionary current accruals is -0.012 (-0.008) and the absolute values of the 
discretionary current accruals is 0.055 (0.039). When we split the sample based on the signs of the 
accruals, our results hold for the positive accrual sample, but not for the negative accrual sample. 
17  We perform two-stage regressions to account for any potential endogeneity between auditor 
specialization and fee dependence, and find similar results.   
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post-SOX periods (t=0.80, p=0.43 and t=-0.90, p=0.37, respectively). The coefficients 
for all two-way interactions are consistent with our main analysis. Overall, the results are 
similar to those reported in the main analysis, though the effect of tenure, fee and audit 
specialization is comparatively weaker in the post-SOX period. 
Audit quality of former Arthur Andersen clients 
Prior research suggests that successor auditors view an Andersen audit as a unique 
source of litigation risk and use earnings conservatism as a risk management strategy 
(Cahan and Zhang 2006). To address this possibility, we remove from our sample 2,340 
Arthur Andersen clients (i.e., those audited by Arthur Andersen in the 2000-2001 period 
and their successor auditors in the 2002-2005 period).  Our untabulated results are robust 
to the exclusion of these clients. 
Alternative proxies of audit quality 
We conduct our empirical tests on additional proxies of audit quality: propensity for 
auditors to issue going-concern opinion to financially distressed firms and the market’s 
response to quarterly earnings surprises (i.e., earnings-returns coefficients). We define 
financially distressed firms to be firms with positive Zmijewski scores.18 There are a 
total of 560 firm-years that meet the criterion and of these, 134 firms (24% of sample) 
receive going-concern opinions for the first time during the sample period. We have 
9,321 firm-years for the earnings response coefficient (ERC) test. 
Untabulated results indicate that for the going concern test, the coefficient estimate 
for DTENU*SPEC is positive and significant (Wald statistic=4.53, p=0.03) and the 
coefficient estimate for DTENU*SPEC*FEE is negative and significant (Wald statistic 
=5.04, p=0.02).  The coefficient estimate for DTENU*FEE is positive but not significant 
                                                 
18 According to Zmijewski (1984), a positive score is an indicator of greater than 50% likelihood of 
bankruptcy. 
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(Wald statistic=0.08, p=0.77). When tenure is proxied by SHORT and LONG, the 
coefficient estimate for LONG*SPEC is positive and significant (Wald statistic=7.97, 
p<0.01) and the coefficient estimate for LONG*SPEC*FEE is negative and significant 
(Wald statistic=4.52, p=0.03). The coefficients for SHORT*SPEC, SHORT*FEE, 
LONG*FEE, and SHORT*SPEC*FEE are not statistically significant. 
For the ERC test, the coefficient estimate for UE*DTENU*SPEC is positive and 
significant (t=2.66, p<0.01) and the coefficient estimate for UE*DTENU*SPEC*FEE is 
negative and significant (t=-2.05, p=0.04). 19   The coefficient estimate for 
UE*DTENU*FEE is insignificant (t=1.45, p=0.15). When tenure is proxied by SHORT 
and LONG, the coefficient estimate for UE*LONG*SPEC is positive and significant 
(t=1.64, p=0.10) and the coefficient estimate for UE*LONG*SPEC*FEE is negative and 
significant (t=-2.02, p=0.04). The coefficients for UE*SHORT*SPEC, UE*SHORT*FEE, 
UE*LONG*FEE, and UE*SHORT*SPEC*FEE are not statistically significant. 
These results for both the going-concern and ERC tests are consistent with our main 
analyses using the accrual quality measure. 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this study, we investigate whether the relation between auditor tenure and audit 
quality is conditional on auditor specialization and fee dependence (in terms of economic 
contribution to the public accounting firm’s income). Our main analyses, using accrual 
quality as a measure of audit quality, show that firms audited by specialists (vs. non-
specialists) have relatively higher audit quality with extended auditor tenure, and that 
this relation is negatively moderated by auditors’ fee dependence on clients. These 
results are generally robust to alternative specifications and sensitivity analyses, and 
                                                 
19 UE is earnings surprise, measured by the difference between actual earnings per share and most recent 
median earnings forecast for the quarter immediately after the disclosure of fee information in the proxy 
statement, scaled by stock price at the beginning of the quarter. 
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across other proxies for audit quality (going concern opinions, earnings response 
coefficients). 
Our study contributes to the literature on the relationship between auditor tenure and 
audit quality. Existing studies examine a main effect of auditor tenure and/or the separate 
moderating effect of either auditor specialization or fee dependence, and findings have 
been mixed. From a theoretical perspective, we extend extant literature by showing that 
the auditor tenure-audit quality relation is moderated by both auditor specialization and 
fee dependence. Focusing on either one moderator alone (either specialization or fee 
dependence) necessarily provides a less complete depiction of the conditions under 
which auditor tenure improves or impairs audit quality.  
Our findings also provide useful inputs to regulators and standard setters in their 
deliberations on the efficacy and costs of mandatory auditor rotation. Our results imply 
that there are benefits to mandatory rotation, but that these benefits are limited in that 
they will not extend to all auditors and their clients. Rather, benefits in terms of 
improved audit quality derived from mandatory auditor rotation are contingent on 
auditors’ industry specialization and fee dependence.  Our findings should also be of 
interest to public accounting firms that have been lobbying against audit firm rotation 
(Pricewaterhouse Coopers 2007).  Perhaps, more importantly, we provide evidence 
useful to public accounting firms in identifying ways they can improve audit quality 
while maintaining long-term ties with existing clients. One way is to invest resources to 
develop specialist expertise in the industry that the client operates in, while another is to 
have a more diversified client base, without overly high dependence on any client. These 
approaches are ultimately policy issues that public accounting firms have to decide on.  
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TABLE 1 
Sample size and industry description 
Panel A: Distribution of sample firms by year 
Year N Percent 
2000 1,896 14.83 
2001 2,529 19.78 
2002 2,511 19.64 
2003 2,332 18.24 
2004 1,995 15.61 
2005 1,520 11.89 
Total 12,783 100.00 
 
Panel B: Distribution of sample firms by industry 
SIC Industry N Percent 
73 Business services, including software 2,001 15.65 
36 Electronic/other electric equipment 1,299 10.16 
28 Chemical and allied products 1,290 10.09 
38 Instruments and related products 1,128 8.82 
35 Industrial machinery/equipment 911 7.13 
49 Electric, Gas, Sanitary services 552 4.32 
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 452 3.54 
50 Durable Goods-Wholesale 350 2.74 
48 Communications 322 2.52 
87 Engr, Acc, Resh, Mgmt, Rel Svcs 320 2.50 
80 Health Services 283 2.21 
59 Miscellaneous Retail 280 2.19 
37 Transportation equipment 270 2.11 
20 Food and Kindred Products 263 2.06 
Others (32 industries)  3,062 23.95 
Total  12,783 100.00 
The sample period is from fiscal years 2000-2005, and the sample consists of 12,783 
non-financial firms audited by Big N public accounting firms, with all information on 
control variables.  
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Table 2 
Coefficient estimates in estimating accrual quality 
 
Variable  Coefficient t-stats 
Intercept α0  0.000 -0.01 
OCFi,t-1 α1 0.135 5.46*** 
OCFi,t α2  -0.272 -8.78*** 
OCFi,t+1 α3  0.112 7.29*** 
ΔREV α4 0.062 5.56*** 
PPEi,t α5  -0.003 -0.56 
    
Average Adj. R2     0.39 
N   286 
 
The table shows mean coefficients from annual cross-sectional regressions of the 
following model: 
 
CAi,t = α0 + α1 OCFi,t-1 + α2 OCFi,t + α3 OCFi,t+1 + α4 ΔREVi,t + α5 PPEi,t + vi,t        
 
The above model is based on Dechow and Dichev (2002), as modified by McNichols 
(2002). CA is current accruals measured by net income before extraordinary items plus 
deprecation and amortization minis operating cash flow; OCF is operating cash flow at 
year t-1, t ,and t+1; ΔREV is change in revenues; PPE is gross value of property, plant, 
and equipment. All variables are scaled by average total assets. The regression is run for 
each industry-year with a minimum of 20 observations in each 2-digit SIC industry. Adj. 
R2 is the average of the adjusted R2 from the 286 industry-year regressions. The t-
statistics are based on the mean of the coefficients from the industry-year regressions. *, 
**, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels (2-tailed), respectively.  
TABLE 3 
Descriptive statistics and correlations between variables used in the accrual quality model 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Median 1st Quartile 3rd Quartile Std Dev. 
Test variables      
DD 0.0111 0.0005 -0.0565 0.0562 0.5048 
|DD| 0.0565 0.0412 0.0174 0.0844 0.0488 
TENU (in years) 10.51 8.00 4.00 14.00 8.62 
DTENU 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 
SHORT 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.41 
LONG 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 
SPEC 0.28 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.45 
FEE (%) 1.41 0.21 0.06 0.89 3.29 
      
Control variables      
MV 5.89 5.93 4.49 7.24 2.08 
INGR 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.12 0.10 
OCF 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.13 0.21 
LITIG 0.40 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.49 
ZSCORE -3.63 -3.81 -4.66 -2.94 1.48 
MB 2.73 2.06 1.27 2.06 2.20 
AGE 2.29 2.30 1.61 3.09 0.97 
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TABLE 3 Continued 
Panel B: Pearson correlation matrix 
 |DD| DTENU SHORT LONG MV INGR OCF LITIG ZSCORE MB AGE SPEC FEE 
|DD| 1.00             
DTENU -0.05* 1.00            
SHORT 0.04* -0.49* 1.00           
LONG -0.05* 1.00* -0.49* 1.00          
MV -0.17* 0.18* -0.07* 0.18* 1.00         
INGR -0.03* 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.12* 1.00        
OCF -0.12* 0.16* -0.01 0.16* 0.37* 0.01 1.00       
LITIG 0.08* -0.07* -0.03* -0.07* -0.06* -0.05* -0.14* 1.00      
ZSCORE 0.08* 0.06* -0.03* 0.06* 0.11* 0.09* 0.38* 0.12* 1.00     
MB 0.06* 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.45* 0.17* 0.18* 0.14* 0.16* 1.00    
AGE -0.11* 0.47* -0.04* 0.47* 0.26* 0.02 0.24* -0.22* 0.01 -0.02 1.00   
SPEC -0.09* 0.07* -0.06* 0.07* 0.07* -0.01 0.04* -0.09* -0.05* -0.02 0.06* 1.00  
FEE -0.03* 0.14* -0.04* 0.14* 0.44* 0.06* 0.24* -0.17* -0.08* 0.04* 0.25* 0.01 1.00 
 
The sample for the accrual quality test consists of 12,783 firm-year observations for the period 2000-2005 that have complete financial information in 
Compustat. The table reports the descriptive statistics and the correlations between variables used in the regression model. |DD| is the absolute value of 
the residuals from the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, as modified by McNichols (2002). The specification of the model is shown in footnotes of 
Table 2. DTENU is an indicator variable that equals one if the auditor tenure is greater than the sample median, and zero otherwise. SHORT is indicator 
variable that equals one when the length of the auditor-client relationship is three years or less, and zero otherwise. LONG is an indicator variable that 
equals one when the length of the auditor-client relationship is nine years or longer, and zero otherwise. MV is natural log of market value. INGR is 
industry sales growth over the year (by two-digit SIC code). OCF is cash flow from operations scaled by total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
LITIG is coded one if the firm operates in a high-litigation industry, and zero otherwise. High-litigation industries are industries with SIC codes 2833-
2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, and 7370-7374. ZSCORE is Zmijewski’s (1984) bankruptcy scores. MB is the market-to-book ratio. AGE is 
log of firm age. SPEC, an indicator variable, equals one if the auditor has at least 24% industry market share for the 2000-2001 period, and 30% for the 
2002-2005 period, and zero otherwise. FEE is measured by the ratio of a particular client’s total fees given all total fees received by the audit firm in a 
city.  
 
TABLE 4  
Auditor tenure, auditor specialization, and client importance on accrual quality 
Panel A: Tenure measured by DTENU 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 
 
φ0 0.226 
(9.89)*** 
0.221 
(9.69)*** 
0.225 
(9.91)*** 
0.217 
(9.52)*** 
DTENU 
 
φ1 -0.006 
(-1.71)* 
0.016 
(1.22) 
0.008 
(0.62) 
0.021 
(1.56) 
MV 
 
φ2 -0.016 
(-6.64)*** 
-0.016 
(-6.64)*** 
-0.016 
(-6.61)*** 
-0.016 
(-6.60)*** 
INGR 
 
φ3 -0.396 
(-8.06)*** 
-0.397 
(-8.06)*** 
-0.396 
(-8.06)*** 
-0.397 
(-8.06)*** 
OCF 
 
φ4 -0.166 
(-5.09)*** 
-0.167 
(-5.11)*** 
-0.167 
(-5.11)*** 
-0.167 
(-5.13)*** 
LITIG 
 
φ5 0.053 
(6.19)*** 
0.053 
(6.21)*** 
0.053 
(6.17)*** 
0.053 
(6.18)*** 
ZSCORE 
 
φ6 0.013 
(3.22)*** 
0.013 
(3.22)*** 
0.013 
(3.22)*** 
0.013 
(3.22)*** 
MB 
 
φ7 0.012 
(6.53)*** 
0.012 
(6.52)*** 
0.012 
(6.53)*** 
0.012 
(6.52)*** 
AGE 
 
φ8 0.008 
(1.25) 
0.008 
(1.30) 
0.007 
(1.22) 
0.008 
(1.32) 
SPEC 
 
φ9 -0.020 
(-2.17)** 
-0.002 
(-0.14) 
-0.020 
(-2.16)** 
0.006 
(0.38) 
FEE 
 
φ10 -0.212 
(-2.24)** 
-0.211 
(-2.62)*** 
-0.124 
(-1.02) 
0.061 
(0.41) 
DTENU*SPEC 
 
φ11  -0.037 
(-1.99)** 
 -0.050 
(-2.35)** 
DTENU*FEE 
 
φ12   -0.170 
(-1.05) 
-0.044 
(-1.21) 
SPEC*FEE 
 
φ13    -0.658 
(-2.56)*** 
DTENU*SPEC*FEE 
 
φ14    0.939 
(2.83)*** 
N  12,783 12,783 12,783 12,783 
Adj R2 (%)  11.91 11.93 11.90 11.93 
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TABLE 4 Continued 
Panel B Tenure measured by SHORT and LONG 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 
 
φ0 0.225 
(9.71)*** 
0.215 
(9.28)*** 
0.223 
(9.66)*** 
0.211 
(9.10)*** 
SHORT 
 
φ1a 0.004 
(2.31)** 
0.015 
(1.04) 
0.005 
(0.40) 
0.016 
(1.09) 
LONG 
 
φ1b 0.0076 
(0.48) 
0.022 
(1.38) 
0.010 
(0.66) 
0.028 
(1.73)* 
MV 
 
φ2 -0.016 
(-6.62)*** 
-0.016 
(-6.63)*** 
-0.016 
(-6.58)*** 
-0.016 
(-6.59)*** 
INGR 
 
φ3 -0.397 
(-8.02)*** 
-0.396 
(-8.01)*** 
-0.396 
(-8.01)*** 
-0.397 
(-8.02)*** 
OCF 
 
φ4 -0.167 
(-5.10)*** 
-0.167 
(-5.11)*** 
-0.167 
(-5.12)*** 
-0.167 
(-5.14)*** 
LITIG 
 
φ5 0.053 
(6.12)*** 
0.053 
(6.13)*** 
0.053 
(6.10)*** 
0.053 
(6.10)*** 
ZSCORE 
 
φ6 0.013 
(3.23)*** 
0.013 
(3.20)*** 
0.013 
(3.23)*** 
0.013 
(3.20)*** 
MB 
 
φ7 0.012 
(6.52)*** 
0.012 
(6.50)*** 
0.012 
(6.53)*** 
0.012 
(6.50)*** 
AGE 
 
φ8 0.007 
(1.11) 
0.008 
(1.14) 
0.007 
(1.08) 
0.008 
(1.16) 
SPEC 
 
φ9 -0.020 
(-2.16)** 
0.014 
(0.68) 
-0.020 
(-2.16)** 
0.021 
(0.92) 
FEE 
 
φ10 -0.212 
(-2.64)*** 
-0.210 
(-2.62)*** 
-0.070 
(-0.42) 
0.110 
(0.50) 
SHORT*SPEC 
 
φ11a  -0.042 
(-1.56) 
 -0.039 
(-1.31) 
LONG*SPEC 
 
φ11b  -0.053 
(-2.22)** 
 -0.065 
(-2.43)** 
SHORT*FEE 
 
φ12a   -0.121 
(-0.51) 
-0.118 
(-0.38) 
LONG*FEE 
 
φ12b   -0.222 
(-1.11) 
-0.493 
(-1.60) 
SPEC*FEE 
 
φ13    -0.600 
(-1.68)* 
SHORT*SPEC*FEE 
 
φ14a    -0.105 
(-0.23) 
LONG*SPEC*FEE 
 
φ14b    0.880 
(2.12)** 
N  12,783 12,783 12,783 12,783 
Adj R2 (%)  11.90 11.93 11.89 11.92 
The regression model is: 
|DD| = φ0 + φ1 TENU + φ2 MV + φ3 INGR+ φ4 OCF + φ5 LITIG + φ6 ZSCORE + φ7 MB + φ8 AGE + φ9 
SPEC + φ10 FEE + φ11 TENU*SPEC+ φ12 TENU*FEE  + φ13 SPEC*FEE + φ14 TENU*SPEC*FEE +Year 
Dummies + ε            
The sample consists of 12,783 firm year observations for the period 2000-2005. The variables used in the 
regression model are as defined in the footnotes of Table 3.  We run the OLS clustered by firm, and with 
year dummies. To conserve space, we do not report the coefficient estimates for the year dummies. For 
each variable, we report the regression coefficient, followed by the t statistic in parentheses. ‘*’, ‘**’, and 
‘***’ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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TABLE 5  
Alternative specification of auditor specialization 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
 Specialization (SPEC) 
measured by CSPEC 
Specialization (SPEC) 
measured by BSPEC 
Intercept 
 
φ0 0.217 
(9.59)*** 
0.212 
(9.27)*** 
0.213 
(9.48)*** 
0.208 
(9.18)*** 
DTENU 
 
φ1 0.012 
(0.84) 
 0.014 
(1.10) 
 
SHORT 
 
φ1a  0.012 
(0.79) 
 0.012 
(0.96) 
LONG 
 
φ1b  0.017 
(1.01) 
 0.019 
(1.28) 
MV 
 
φ2 -0.017 
(-6.79)*** 
-0.016 
(-6.76)*** 
-0.017 
(-6.72)*** 
-0.016 
(-6.70)*** 
INGR 
 
φ3 -0.396 
(-8.04)*** 
-0.396 
(-7.99)*** 
-0.397 
(-8.07)*** 
-0.397 
(-8.05)*** 
OCF 
 
φ4 -0.168 
(-5.14)*** 
-0.168 
(-5.15)*** 
-0.168 
(-5.16)*** 
-0.168 
(-5.17)*** 
LITIG 
 
φ5 0.051 
(6.05)*** 
0.051 
(5.97)*** 
0.051 
(6.05)*** 
0.051 
(5.97)*** 
ZSCORE 
 
φ6 0.014 
(3.30)*** 
0.014 
(3.31)*** 
0.014 
(3.32)*** 
0.014 
(3.32)*** 
MB 
 
φ7 0.012 
(6.63)*** 
0.012 
(6.62)*** 
0.012 
(6.61)*** 
0.012 
(6.58)*** 
AGE 
 
φ8 0.008 
(1.24) 
0.007 
(1.10) 
0.008 
(1.33) 
0.008 
(1.17) 
SPEC 
 
φ9 0.009 
(0.61) 
0.016 
(0.76) 
0.043 
(1.52) 
0.057 
(1.48) 
FEE 
 
φ10 0.009 
(0.06) 
0.124 
(0.56) 
0.036 
(0.28) 
0.119 
(0.63) 
DTENU*SPEC 
 
φ11 -0.444 
(-2.09)** 
 -0.378 
(-2.12)** 
 
SHORT*SPEC 
 
φ11a  -0.250 
(-0.76) 
 -0.187 
(-0.70) 
LONG*SPEC 
 
φ11b  -0.559 
(-2.09)** 
 -0.461 
(-2.04)** 
DTENU*FEE 
 
φ12 -0.015 
(-0.73) 
 -0.054 
(-1.60) 
 
SHORT*FEE 
 
φ12a  -0.017 
(-0.62) 
 -0.039 
(-0.79) 
LONG*FEE 
 
φ12b  -0.021 
(-0.86) 
 -0.068 
(-1.60) 
SPEC*FEE 
 
φ13 -0.374 
(-1.48) 
-0.502 
(-1.39) 
-1.101 
(-3.58)*** 
-1.093 
(-2.69)*** 
DTENU*SPEC*FEE 
 
φ14 0.673 
(2.09)** 
 1.323 
(3.36)*** 
 
SHORT*SPEC*FEE 
 
φ14a  0.295 
(0.63) 
 -0.012 
(-0.02) 
LONG*SPEC*FEE 
 
φ14b  0.802 
(1.95)** 
 1.314 
(2.76)*** 
N  12,783 12,783 12,783 12,783 
Adj R2 (%)  11.86 11.83 11.90 11.88 
CSPEC, an indicator variable, equals one if the auditor is the leader in an industry in a particular city.   
BSPEC, an indicator variable, equals one if the auditor is is a specialist both at the national and city level. 
See footnotes of tables 3 and 4 for model specification and variable definitions. ‘*’, ‘**’, and ‘***’ 
denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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TABLE 6  
Signed accruals tests 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Positive Accruals Negative Accruals 
Intercept 
 
φ0 0.205 
(6.12)*** 
0.193 
(5.63)*** 
0.225 
(7.81)*** 
0.225 
(7.77)*** 
DTENU 
 
φ1 0.007 
(0.34) 
 0.036 
(2.10)** 
 
SHORT 
 
φ1a  0.032 
(1.33) 
 0.002 
(0.13) 
LONG 
 
φ1b  0.021 
(0.80) 
 0.036 
(1.98)** 
MV 
 
φ2 -0.020 
(-4.93)*** 
-0.020 
(-4.90)*** 
-0.012 
(-4.31)*** 
-0.012 
(-4.34)*** 
INGR 
 
φ3 -0.366 
(-4.05)*** 
-0.366 
(-4.02)*** 
-0.428 
(-10.58)*** 
-0.428 
(-10.58)*** 
OCF 
 
φ4 -0.077 
(-1.76)* 
-0.077 
(-1.77)* 
-0.293 
(-5.64)*** 
-0.293 
(-5.64)*** 
LITIG 
 
φ5 0.056 
(4.34)*** 
0.055 
(4.21)*** 
0.050 
(4.45)*** 
0.050 
(5.44)*** 
ZSCORE 
 
φ6 0.016 
(2.95)*** 
0.016 
(2.95)*** 
0.012 
(2.00)** 
0.012 
(1.99)** 
MB 
 
φ7 0.016 
(5.83)*** 
0.016 
(5.80)*** 
0.008 
(3.24)*** 
0.008 
(3.24)*** 
AGE 
 
φ8 0.019 
(1.77)* 
0.018 
(1.54) 
-0.002 
(-0.30) 
-0.002 
(-0.33) 
SPEC 
 
φ9 0.012 
(0.40) 
0.037 
(0.91) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
0.003 
(0.17) 
FEE 
 
φ10 0.021 
(0.09) 
0.166 
(0.49) 
0.093 
(0.50) 
0.057 
(0.21) 
DTENU*SPEC 
 
φ11 -0.460 
(-1.76)* 
 -0.056 
(-2.61)*** 
 
SHORT*SPEC 
 
φ11a  -0.316 
(-0.65) 
 0.084 
(0.24) 
LONG*SPEC 
 
φ11b  -0.605 
(-1.72)* 
 -0.355 
(-2.45)*** 
DTENU*FEE 
 
φ12 -0.043 
(-1.21) 
 -0.393 
(-1.43) 
 
SHORT*FEE 
 
φ12a  -0.069 
(-1.33) 
 -0.007 
(-0.23) 
LONG*FEE 
 
φ12b  -0.069 
(-1.49) 
 -0.058 
(-1.06) 
SPEC*FEE 
 
φ13 -0.662 
(-1.50) 
-0.672 
(-1.07) 
-0.590 
(-2.53)*** 
-0.432 
(-1.36)*** 
DTENU*SPEC*FEE 
 
φ14 1.057 
(1.92)** 
 0.748 
(2.06)** 
 
SHORT*SPEC*FEE 
 
φ14a  0.085 
(0.11) 
 -0.399 
(-0.86) 
LONG*SPEC*FEE 
 
φ14b  1.066 
(1.89)* 
 0.589 
(1.40) 
N  6,441 6,441 6,342 6,342 
Adj R2 (%)  11.29 11.27 13.59 13.53 
We report the results separately for firms with positive and negative residuals from the Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) test, as modified by McNichols (2002). For the negative accruals sample, we multiply the 
residuals by -1 to conserve the signs of the coefficients. See footnote of tables 3 and 4 for model 
specification and variable definitions. ‘*’, ‘**’, and ‘***’ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
(two-tailed), respectively. 
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